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to protect against the victimization of 
people who were particularly wlner-
able to discrimination. R.A. v., 112S. 
Ct. at 2549. The Court, reasoning that 
the "emotive impact of speech on its 
audience is not a secondary effect, 
found that the St. Paul ordinance was 
not directed to secondary effects be-
cause it handicapped "specific catego-
ries" of speech. [d. (quotiug Boos \I. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988». 
In a concurring opinion, Justice 
White argued that the case should have 
been decided by finding the ordinance 
fatally overbroad. [d. at 2550. As 
written, the ordinance could prevent 
modes of expression that had offensive 
content but were not themselves threat-
ening or harmful. For this reason, 
Justice White charged the majority with 
renouncing the traditional use of strict 
scrutiny review as atool ofFirstAmend-
ment analysis. Under a strict scrutiny 
analysis, restrictions on speech are jus-
tified where the statute is narrowly 
tailored and necessary for the achieve-
ment of a compelling interest. The St. 
Paul ordinance, according to Justice 
White, could have survived a strict 
scrutiny review if it was more nar-
rowly drafted. He faulted the majority 
for effecting an underinclusive stan-
dard which suggested that the statute 
should have banned a wider category 
of speech than was necessary to achieve 
the city's interest. This perceived de-
parture from strict scrutiny analysis 
was criticized in light of the recent 
Supreme Court decision Burson \I. 
Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), in 
which the participating members of 
the present Court agreed that a strict 
scrutiny standard is applicable to a 
case involving a First Amendmentchal-
lenge to acontent-based statute. R.A. V. , 
112 S. Ct. at 2551. 
The concurrence also argued that 
the majority violated Court precedent 
by not categorically including fighting 
words among constitutionally prohib-
ited speech. [d. at 2552-53. Justice 
White recognized that fighting words 
made up no "essential part of any expo-
sition of ideas" and were wholly un-
protected by the FirSt Amendment be-
cause they were "directed at individu-
als to provoke violence or to inflict 
injury." [d. at 2553 (quoting 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
In a separate concurring opinion, 
Justice Stevens noted his frustration 
with the majority's attitude towards 
the dangers of hate speech. R.A. V., 112 
S. Ct. at 2570. In a footnote referring 
to the Los Angeles riots, he wrote, 
"one need look no further than the 
recent social unrest in the nation's cit-
ies to see that race-based threats may 
cause more harm to society ... than 
other threats." [d. at 2570 n.9. 
The Supreme Court's ruling that 
banning cross burnings and swastika 
displays on the basis of content vio-
lates the First Amendment is signifi-
cant because most states have enacted 
some form of hate speech legislation 
that will be invalidated by this deci-
sion. R.A. V. \I. St. Paul will probably 
stand as one of the most far-reaching 
interpretations of the First Amend-
ment. Although the bottom line was 
balanced, the analysis was insensitive. 
The majority's seeming perception of 
hate speech as no more than a societal 
nuisance is offensive to the many 
Americans whose lives were threat-
ened by the very actions which the 
majority characterizes as merely "ob-
noxious." To many, the sight of a 
burning cross on the front lawn or a 
swastika display on the temple wall 
exceeds mere speech and proposes a 
direct threat of physical violence. 
Moreover, the Court's fractured con-
sensus on First Amendment analysis, 
as applied to hate speech, will likely 
leave many lawyers bewildered over 
how to litigate hate crimes, and will 
leave many legislators perplexed about 
how to formulate a hate crime statute. 
- Kim Germaine Judd 
Lucas\l. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil: LANDOWNER COMPENSA-
TIONREQUIRED WIIEREPROP-
ERTY REGULATIONS DEPRIVE 
ALLECONONUCALLYBENEn-
CIAL USE OF LAND UNLESS 
REGULATIONS ARE INHERENT 
IN TITLE. 
The United States Supreme Court's 
most recent inverse condemnation de-
cision,Lucas \I. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), intro-
duced a new approach to determine 
whether a property owner has suffered 
a regulatory taking requiring the pay-
ment of just compensation. The Court 
developed a test which inquires into 
the underlying principles ofthe state's 
property and nuisance law. The new 
test considers whether the challenged 
regulations merely make explicit re-
strictions on the property's use that 
were inherent in the title to the property 
itself. If so, then no compensation is 
required under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, even if the regulation 
deprives the owner of all economically 
beneficial use of the land. 
In 1986, David Lucas purchased 
two residential lots on the Isle ofpalms, 
a barrier island located east of Charles-
ton, South Carolina. Just as neighbor-
ing landowners had done on their land, 
Lucas intended to build single-family 
homes on his $975,000 parcels. His 
plans, however, were thwarted by the 
South Carolina Legislature in 1988 
with the passage of the Beachfront 
Management Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 
48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 
1991) (''the Act"). The Act established 
a baseline connecting the furthest-in-
land points of erosion during the last 
forty years and prohibited the con-
struction of "occupiable improve-
ments" seaward of the baseline. Be-
cause the baseline fell inland ofLucas' s 
lots and his proposed homes consti-
tuted "occupiable improvements." 
Lucas was prohibited from building on 
his land. 
Lucas challenged the Act in the 
South Carolina Court of Common 
Pleas, arguing that the law's effect on 
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his property constituted a taking with-
out just compensation in violation of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Lucas, 112 S. O. at 2890. The trial 
court agreed and reasoned that Lucas 
must be compensated because there 
were virtually no restrictions on the 
use of the land when Lucas purchased 
it. Id. ,The court thus found that the Act 
deprived Lucas of any reasonable eco-
nomic use of the lots, interfered with 
the unrestricted right of use, and ren-
dered the lots valueless. Id The South 
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing itself bound by the legislature's 
conclusion that coastal zone construc-
tion threatened South Carolina's 
beaches, a valuable public resource. 
Regulations designed to prevent such 
public harms, the court ruled, do not 
require compensation despite their ef-
fect upon property value. 
The United States Supreme Court 
began its analysis by addressing a ripe-
ness issue raised by the South Carolina 
Coastal Council. After argument but 
before the South Carolina Supreme 
Court had rendered its opinion, the Act 
was amended to allow the Council to 
issue "special permits" for the con-
struction or reconstruction ofhabitable 
structures seaward of the baseline. Id. 
at 2891. Because the South Carolina 
Supreme Court declined to base its 
decision on ripeness grounds, the Su-
preme Court found it appropriate to 
address the case on its merits, rather 
than ordering that Lucas pursue relief 
by obtaining special permits. Id. 
The Court then traced a brief his-
tory of its takings cases, noting that 
this rubric had fostered few clear rules 
and numerous exceptions. Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922), had acknowledged that a 
'''regulation [that] goes too far ... will 
be recognized as a taking .... Lucas, 
112 S. O. at 2893 (quoting Mahon, 
260 U.S. at 415). The problem with 
this recognition, the Court explained, 
was that the phrase ''too far" had never 
been adequately defined, necessitating 
acase-by-case factual analysis that pro-
duced inconsistent decisions. Id. Two 
categories of regulatory action did not 
require this fact-specific inquiry, how-
ever, but instead warranted compensa-
tion regardless of the public interest 
advanced. Id The first category in-
volvedthoseregulations that compelled 
the owner to suffer a physical invasion 
of his land, and the second involved 
regulations that denied the landowner 
all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of the land. Id. The Court 
concluded that a regulation which re-
quires an owner to "leave his property 
economically idle" effects a 
compensable taking. Id at 2895. 
The Court noted that because Lucas 
had not challenged either the Act's 
pwposes or its means, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court had considered his 
claim governed by the United States 
Supreme Court's long history of Due 
Process and Takings Clause challenges. 
/d at 2896-97. This line of cases 
indicated that the state's police power 
to enjoin landowners from activities 
akin to public nuisances was constito-
tionallypennissible. /d at2897. While 
acknowledging that many of these 
cases suggested that "harmful or nox-
ious uses" of property could be pre-
vented by government regulation with-
out requiring compensation, the Court 
stated that the South Carolina Supreme 
Court erred in mechanically applying 
that principle to Lucas's case. /d. 
The Court explained that its "harm-
ful or noxious use" analysis was sim-
ply the predecessor to its laterrecogni-
tion that regulations which substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests 
are not takings. /d. However, the 
Court elaborated that "noxious-use 
logic" could not serve as the basis by 
which to distinguish regulatory tak-
ings requiring compensation from those 
which do not. /d at 2899. The Court 
explained that the prevention ofa nox-
ious use was simply the early manifes-
tation of the police power justification 
necessary to sustain, without compen-
sation, any regulatory reduction in 
value. /d. at 2898-99. Additionally, 
the Court noted that drawing the dis-
tinction between regulations which 
prevent harmful uses and those which 
confer benefits is a "difficult, if not 
impossible" task. Id at 2899. 
After detailing the inadequacy of 
noxious-use analysis, the Court intro-
duced a new takings test that looks to 
the "nature of the owner's estate" to 
see if ''the proscribed use interests 
were not part of his title to begin with." 
Id If the proscribed use was not inher-
ent in the landowner's title, compensa-
tion is not required even if the regula-
tion deprives the landowner of all ec0-
nomically beneficial use of his land. 
Id. The test therefore asks whether 
government regulation simply makes 
manifest limitations on the landowner'S 
rights that were included in the title to 
the land. /d. 
This new approach was buttressed 
as being a derivative ofthe ''bundle of 
rights" concept, because landowners 
would naturally expect their land to be 
subject to some level of regulation. /d 
at 2899-2900. The new test, the Court 
explained, recognizes that an 
uncompensated regulatory taking could 
not be newly asserted by the govern-
ment unless it was an outgrowth of a 
pre-existing limitation on the owner's 
title. /d. at 2900. The Court explained 
that such a regulation would merely 
mimic the result that adjacent land-
owners could achieve in court based on 
the State's nuisance law. /d The 
Court illustrated this principle through 
the example of a lakebed owner who 
was denied a permit to fill in the lake 
and thereby flood others' land. /d. The 
lakebed owner would not be entitled to 
compensation because this limitation 
on his use is inherent in the title he 
holds. /d 
The Court further explained that 
the ''total taking" inquiry required by 
the new test ordinarily would entail 
examination of several factors relative 
to the landowner claim ing a taking. /d. 
at 290 1. Among these are the degree of 
harm posed by the claimant's activi-
ties, the social value ofthe activities, 
their suitability to the location, and the 
feasibility of avoiding any alleged 
harm. /d. 
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Applying this test to Lucas's case, 
the Court found it unlikely that com-
mon-law principles would have pre-
vented Lucas from building on his 
land, but left judgment on the issue to 
the South Carolina Supreme Court on 
remand. Id TheSouthCaroIinaCoastal 
Council's burden on remand, the Court 
noted, is to "identify background prin-
ciples of nuisance and property law 
that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now in-
tends in the circumstances in which the 
property is presently found." Id at 
2901-02. Only by sustaining this bur-
den could the State contend that the 
Beachfront Management Act's pro-
scription of all such beneficial uses did 
not amount to a taking. Id. at 2902. 
With the development of a new test 
for regulatory takings in Lucas, the 
Supreme Court did not wholly reject 
its earlier analyses of public nuisances, 
legitimate state interests, or economi-
cally viable uses of private land. Rather, 
the Lucas test mandates an antecedent 
examination of state property and nui-
sance law to determine whether regu-
lations on land use effect a taking re-
quiring compensation of the landowner. 
Lower courts may have difficulty 
implementing the Lucas test, however, 
because the Court outlined the test in 
broad terms and did not provide spe-
cific guidelines. Consequently, poten-
tialland purchasers must exercise cau-
tion and determine if property is sub-
ject to implied limitations on its use. 
- Joshua D. Bruch 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools: DAMAGES ARE AV AIL-
ABLE FOR AN ACTION 
BROUGHT TO ENFORCE TITLE 
IX OF THE EDUCATION 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972. 
In a recent unanimous decision, the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
federal courts have the authority to 
award appropriate remedies in actions 
brought pursuant to Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (Title 
IX). Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. 
Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). In so 
holding, the Court maintained the gen-
eral principle that absent a clear indica-
tion by Congress to the contrary, fed-
eral courts have the power to award 
appropriate relief in cases brought un-
der a federal statute. 
Petitioner, Christine Franklin, was 
a student at North Gwinnett High 
School in Georgia. Respondent, 
Gwinnett County School District, op-
erated the school with federal funds. 
On December 29, 1988, Franklin filed 
a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia, alleging that she had been a 
victim of sexual harassment and abuse 
by a teacher, Andrew Hill. She sought 
damages pursuant to Title IX, which 
provides in part that "[ n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." Id. at 1031 n.l 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988». 
Subsequent to Franklin filing the com-
plaint, Hill resigned from his position 
at North Gwinnett High School on the 
condition that all pending matters and 
investigations be dropped. The school 
closed its investigation. 
The district court dismissed 
Franklin's complaint, holding that Title 
IX does not provide for an award of 
damages. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed. Noting that Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 and 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
have been interpreted similarly, the 
appellate court relied on Drayden v. 
Needville Indep. Sck Dist., 642 F.2d 
129 (5th Cir. 1981), which held that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not pro-
vide for an award of damages, as its 
authority for not granting damages 
under Title IX. The court further rea-
soned that damages were limited under 
statutes that were enacted pursuant to 
Congress's Spending Clause power. 
Because Title IX was enacted under 
the spending clause without an express 
provision for damages, the court held 
that damages were unavailable. The 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to settle the conflicting deci-
sions among the circuit courts on the 
issue of whether the implied right of 
action underTitie IX authorizes a claim 
for damages. 
In an opinion delivered by Justice 
White, the Supreme Court first ac-
knowledged the general rule that 
''where legal rights have been invaded 
and a federal statute provides for a 
general right to sue for such invasion, 
federal courts may use any available 
remedy to make good the wrong done." 
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033 (quoting 
Bel/v. Hood, 327U.S. 678, 684(1946». 
The Court also recognized that afford-
ing a remedy for wrongs was deeply 
rooted in American history and in sup-
port thereof quoted Chief Justice 
Marshall's declaration that our gov-
emment"bas been emphatically termed 
a government oflaws, and not of men. 
It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high appellation, if the laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 
1033 (quoting Marbury v. Madison,S 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1908». 
In arguing that damages should not 
be provided under Title IX, Respon-
dents and the United States as amicus 
curiae insisted that the presumption in 
favor of damages no longer existed aDd 
emphasized that both the statute and 
the legislative intent behind the statute 
were silent as to damages. Franklin, 
112 S. Ct. at 1034. Respondents con-
tended that regardless ofthe presump-
tion that existed traditionally or at the 
time Bell was decided, Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) nulli-
fied the presumption by holding that 
''the question of who may enforce a 
statutory right is fundamentally differ-
ent from the question of who may 
enforce a right that is protected by the 
Constitution." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 
1 034 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 241). 
In rejecting this contention, the Court 
held that Davis dealt with whether one 
had a cause of action, not with whether 
one was entitled to any relief under a 
particular cause of action. Franklin, 
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